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Abstract
In this article we study the impact of the negotiation environment on the perfor-
mance of several intra-team strategies (team dynamics) for agent-based negoti-
ation teams that negotiate with an opponent. An agent-based negotiation team
is a group of agents that joins together as a party because they share common
interests in the negotiation at hand. It is experimentally shown how negotiation
environment conditions like the deadline of both parties, the concession speed
of the opponent, similarity among team members, and team size affect perfor-
mance metrics like the minimum utility of team members, the average utility of
team members, and the number of negotiation rounds. Our goal is identifying
which intra-team strategies work better in different environmental conditions
in order to provide useful knowledge for team members to select appropriate
intra-team strategies according to environmental conditions.
Keywords: Negotiation Teams, Agreement Technologies, Automated
Negotiation, Collective Decision Making, Multi-agent Systems
1. Introduction
Agreement technologies [26, 37] conform an emergent research area among
scholars in artificial intelligence and autonomous agent systems. Autonomous
software agents act reactively and proactively with the objective of maximizing
their human users’ goals. Nevertheless, as systems tend to be more complex, so
do agents’ goals, and agents cannot achieve their goals without the cooperation
of other agents. Given the open nature of many multi-agent systems, con-
flict may be inherent among agents. Hence, distributed mechanisms that allow
agents to solve conflict and cooperate are a necessity. Agreement technologies
have been actively researched bearing in mind the aforementioned necessity.
Automated negotiation [22, 18, 25] is one of the core topics in agreement
technologies. Basically, agents in conflict engage in an automatic offer exchange
process which gradually leads towards a final solution, or agreement, that solves
conflict and makes cooperation among agents possible. The most common use
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for automated negotiation has been electronic commerce [24], but it should be
highlighted that the applicability of this technology has been demonstrated in
other domains like collaborative design [21], labor management disputes [42],
and mediation between human negotiation parties [3].
Despite being widely studied by scholars from different disciplines like arti-
ficial intelligence, game theory, and social sciences, studies have largely focused
on processes whose parties (bilateral, or multiparty) are formed by single indi-
viduals [10, 8, 11, 16, 6, 12, 1, 14, 13]. However, some real world scenarios bring
about negotiation parties that are formed by more than a single individual. For
instance, when an organization negotiates with another organization the selling
of a product line, it is usual for organizations to send a group of representatives
to negotiate with the other organization. Another example, probably a more
quotidian example, involves a married couple that negotiates the purchase of a
house with a seller. In this case, the married couple is actually a negotiation
party which is formed by two individuals instead than a single individual party.
To conclude with the list of real examples, the reader could also think of a group
of friends that want to go on a holiday together. This party, conformed by all
the friends, has to negotiate a deal with the travel agency if they want to achieve
their desired goal.
This kind of multi-individual party is known in the social sciences as a ne-
gotiation team [43, 2, 1, 14]: a group of interdependent people that join and act
together as a single negotiation party because of their shared interests, related
to a negotiation. The rationale behind negotiation teams is mainly twofold.
First, team members may have different expertise and negotiation skills that
are needed to tackle the negotiation problem successfully. Second, the multi-
individual entity that negotiates may be formed by multiple stakeholders with
different sub-goals and preferences regarding the final negotiation outcome. We
can imagine how an IT company may send a negotiation team formed by experts
(different knowledge and skills) from the sales department, marketing depart-
ment, and R&D department to successfully negotiate a new project with the
local administration, how the wife and the husband may have different opinions
with respect to house pricing, location, and facilities, and how each friend may
have different interests regarding hotel location, number of days to spend, and
pricing regarding their travel.
Electronic applications, and consequently automated negotiation, are not
alien to scenarios that may involve agent-based negotiation teams (ABNT).
For instance, group travel e-markets, group buying in e-markets, electronic
management of farming cooperatives, negotiation support systems for real hu-
man teams, and agent-based simulation may be some of the applications where
ABNT may be used. From our point of view, we are interested in ABNT whose
members may have different preferences regarding the negotiation issues, and,
more specifically, we are interested in models for electronic markets.
In this paper, we present four intra-team strategies for an ABNT that ne-
gotiates with a single opponent. Intra-team strategies, also known as team
dynamics, govern which decisions are taken as a team, and how and when those
decisions are taken [34]. The relationship between intra-team strategies and
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team performance is direct. Hence, it became the focus of our current research.
It has been documented that environment conditions such as the deadline, con-
cession speed, and reservation utility may affect the impact of single-individual
bilateral strategies [10]. However, in the team case, new conditions like the
number of team members, team preferences’ diversity, and the emergent ef-
fect of aggregating team members’ behaviors/actions may also end up affecting
team performance. Prior to the negotiation process, negotiation teams face the
challenge of selecting which intra-team strategy should be employed. If environ-
mental conditions have an effect on the performance of the different intra-team
strategies, the intra-team strategy for the negotiation at hand should be selected
accordingly to the current environmental conditions inferred by team members.
Our research goal is identifying which intra-team strategies perform better ac-
cording to different negotiation environments under different team performance
measures. The long term goal is employing the results of this article for helping
team members to select the proper intra-team strategy.
Hence, four intra-team strategies that guarantee four minimum levels of
unanimity regarding team decisions are presented in this article: representa-
tive (no unanimity guaranteed), Similarity Simple Voting (plurality/majority
guaranteed), Similarity Borda Voting (semi-unanimity guaranteed), and Full
Unanimity Mediated (unanimity guaranteed). Due to the large amount of vari-
ables that may affect the negotiation, we employ an empirical approach to study
the behavior of the four intra-team strategies. We study and identify which are
the most appropriate strategies according to different environmental conditions
and team performance measures. This article, is partially based on our previous
work regarding intra-team strategies for negotiation teams [35, 33], where we
presented initial results and simulations. In this article, we extend our empiri-
cal experiments by incorporating new environmental conditions (i.e., team size,
different deadlines), carrying out a more fine-grained analysis of previous envi-
ronmental conditions (i.e., deadline, concession speeds), and presenting revised
versions of the four intra-team strategies.
The article is organized as follows. First, we describe the assumptions of
our negotiation model (Section 2). After that, the details of the four intra-
team strategies are thoroughly described in Section 3. Then, in Section 4 the
article depicts which negotiation environments and team performance metrics
have been studied, and it presents the results and analysis of our experiments.
Afterwards, the present work is related to other works in the area of artificial
intelligence and automated negotiation (Section 5). Finally, we briefly state the
conclusions of our study and point out some future and interesting lines of work
in Section 6.
2. General Model Description
In this section, we describe the assumptions of our model. We have divided
the assumptions in two different categories: general assumptions and opponent
assumptions. The general assumptions directly affect the nature of the negoti-
ation at hand and are shared between parties (e.g., protocol, number of parties,
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attribute types, etc.), whereas opponent assumptions describe the strategy car-
ried out by the opponent.
2.1. Negotiation Setting
• The team A is formed by M different agents ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ M . It should be
stated that team membership is considered static during the negotiation
process. Dynamic ABNT are not considered in this work, and they are
appointed as future work.
• The common goal of the team A is negotiating a successful deal with the
opponent op. Thus, in this case we assume an implicit representation of
the teams’ goal.
• It is assumed that information is private, even among team members.
Therefore, agents do not know other agents’ utility functions, strate-
gies, reservation utilities, or deadlines. On top of that, we also assume
agents with bounded computational resources. Thus, we take a heuristic
approach which seeks near optimal results while being computationally
tractable.
• It is assumed that the team A and the opponent op communicate following
an alternating bilateral protocol [30]. One of the two parties acts as the
initiator, and it is entitled to propose the first offer. The other party
receives the offer and can respond with two different actions: accept the
offer (successful negotiation), or propose a counteroffer. If a counteroffer is
proposed, the initiator party receives the offer and it can either accept the
counteroffer or propose another offer, starting a new negotiation round.
Depending on the intra-team strategy, one of the team members or a team
mediator is responsible of the communications with the opponent. In this
setting, the fact that one of the parties is a team remains unknown to the
other party.
• Additionally, it is also assumed that the negotiation is time-bounded, and
each party has a private deadline TA (team deadline), Top (opponent dead-
line). When its deadline is achieved, the party leaves the negotiation and
it is considered a failed negotiation. In the case of TA, it is considered
a joint deadline for all of the team members, who have agreed upon this
deadline prior to the negotiation at hand.
• The mediator, if present, is never a perfect mediator that aggregates the
utility functions of all the team members. This assumption is taken due to
the fact that, depending on the application, some team members may not
be completely trustable and may attempt to exaggerate/change their pref-
erences to manipulate the negotiation process. This mischievous behavior
is easily carried out when aggregating utility functions.
• The negotiation domain is comprised of n real attributes whose domains
can be scaled to [0, 1]. Thus, the possible number of offers is [0, 1]n. In this
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domain, a complete offer is represented as X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where xi
is a specific instantiation of attribute i. Additionally, we use the notation
Xti→j to denote that offer X was sent at round t from party i to party j.
• Every agent i (team member or opponent) has its preferences represented
by means of linear additive utility functions in the form:
Ui(X) = wi,1 Vi,1(xi,1) + wi,2 Vi,2(x2) + ...+ wi,n Vi,n(xn) (1)
where X is a complete offer, xj , is the value given to the j-th attribute,
Vi,j(.) is the valuation function for attribute j used by agent i to normal-
ize the attribute value to [0, 1], and wi,j is the weight/importance given
by agent i to attribute j in the negotiation process. Several observations
should be made regarding these utility functions: (i) weights are normal-
ized so that
∑n
j=1 wi,j = 1; (ii) attributes are assumed to be independent
from each other. Thus, the valuation of one of the attributes does not
alter the others attributes’ valuation; (iii) it is assumed that valuation
functions are either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreas-
ing. Moreover, we assume that team members share the same type of
monotonic function (i.e., increasing or decreasing) for each Vi,j(.). As for
the opponent, it is assumed that the monotonic function for Vi,j(.) is the
opposite type to that of team members. It is reasonable to assume this
model for valuation functions in e-commerce scenarios. Buyers usually
share the same type of valuation function for attributes such as the price
(monotonically decreasing), product quality (monotonically increasing),
and the dispatch time (monotonically decreasing), whereas sellers usually
use the opposite type of monotonic functions (monotonically increasing
for price, monotonically decreasing for product quality, and monotoni-
cally increasing for dispatch time); (iv) attribute weights wi,j are different
for team members. This way, we are able to represent the fact that some
team members may be more interested in some attributes whereas other
team members may be more interested in other attributes (e.g., some team
members prefer price over quality, while others give a higher priority to the
product quality). Obviously, the weights of the opponent’s utility function
may be different from those of team members; (v) since team members
share the same type of monotonic function, if one of the team members
increases its utility by increasing/decreasing one of the attribute values,
the other team members will stay at the same utility level or they will
also increase their utility. Thus, there is potential for cooperation among
team members.
• The opponent has a reservation utility RUop. Any offer whose utility is
lower than RUop will be rejected. Each team member ai has a private
reservation utility RUai . This individual reservation utility is not shared
among teammates. Therefore, a team member ai will reject any offer
whose value is under RUai . In this setting, reservation utilities represent
the individual utility of each agent if the negotiation process fails. For the
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experiments, the reservation utilities are drawn from uniform distributions
RUop = U [0, 0.25] and RUai = U [0, 0.25].
2.2. Opponent Model
The opponent op is modeled as a single agent for the sake of simplicity.
We acknowledge that the other party may be another team (e.g., organization
vs organization), but the focus of our study in this article, and the kind of
applications in our mind, involve negotiations between one team and one single
agent. For the opponent model we used well-known strategies in the agent
negotiation literature:
• The opponent uses a time-based tactic during the negotiation process.
In multi-attribute, time-bounded negotiations, assuming that agents con-
cede gradually to reach an agreement is usual. This is especially important
when agents do not know other agents’ preferences and strategies, since
an exploration of the agreement space is required for discovering possi-
ble agreements. A concession strategy typically starts by demanding the
maximum aspiration and, as the negotiation process advances, the aspi-
ration demanded tends to be lowered. The speed at which the strategy
concedes is regulated by the concession speed parameter. In this article,
we employed a time-based concession tactic inspired in tactics used by
other authors [10, 23]:
sop(t) = 1− (1−RUop)( t
Top
)
1
βop (2)
where t is the current negotiation round and βop is a parameter that gov-
erns the concession speed. On the one hand, when βop = 1 the concession
is linear and each negotiation round the same amount of concession is
performed, and when βop < 1 the concession is Boulware and very little
is conceded at the start of the negotiation process but the agent concedes
faster as the negotiation deadline approaches. On the other hand, when
βop > 1 the tactic is conceder and the agents concede fast towards the
reservation utility in the first rounds.
• The opponent uses an offer acceptance criterion acop(.) during the nego-
tiation process. It is formalized as follows:
acop(X
t
A→op) =
{
accept if sop(t+ 1) ≤ Uop(XtA→op)
reject otherwise
(3)
where t is the current round, XtA→op is the offer received from the team,
Uop(.) is the utility function of the opponent, and sop(.) is the opponent
concession strategy. Thus, an offer is accepted by op if it reports a utility
that is equal to or greater than the utility of the offer that op would
propose in the next round.
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• When the opponent has to propose a counteroffer at negotiation round t, it
proposes an offer Xtop→A whose utility is Uop(X
t
op→A) = sop(t). However,
depending on the negotiation domain, there may be an infinite number of
offers that comply with the previous condition. Similarity heuristics are
a largely used family of heuristics in agent-based negotiation literature
[11, 23, 34]. Thus, we assumed that the opponent attempts to propose the
offer that is the most similar to the last offer received from the team, and
whose utility is Uop(X
t
op→A) = sop(t). The Euclidean distance was used
as similarity function.
3. Intra-Team Strategies
An intra-team strategy defines what decisions have to be taken by a negoti-
ation team, how those decisions are taken, and when those decisions are taken.
In a bilateral negotiation process between a team and an opponent, the deci-
sions that must be taken (what) are which offers are sent to the opponent, and
whether or not opponent offers are accepted. Given the fact that a negotiation
team is formed by more than a single individual, decisions should take into
account the interests of the team members. How decisions are taken will deter-
mine the satisfaction level of the team with the final decision. In this article,
most of the team interactions in intra-team strategies are carried out during the
negotiation (when).
Next, we describe the four intra-team strategies that we propose: Represen-
tative (RE), Similarity Simple Voting (SSV), Similarity Borda Voting (SBV)
and Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM). Each strategy is capable of guaranteeing
a minimum level of unanimity regarding the offer sent to the opponent, and
whether or not to accept the opponent’s offer. Another difference between the
four strategies is the presence of a mediator and its level of activity (none, coordi-
nation tasks, very active participation). Table 1 captures the main qualitative
differences between the four intra-team strategies according to the aforemen-
tioned criteria.
Intra-Team Strategy Unanimity level (How) Pre-negotiation? (When) Mediated?
RE Unilateral Minimum No
SSV Plurality/Majority Minimum Only coordination
SBV Semi-Unanimity Minimum Only coordination
FUM Unanimity Information sharing Very Active
Table 1: A brief qualitative comparison among the four intra-team strategies presented in this
article
3.1. Representative (RE)
The Representative strategy (RE) is perhaps the simplest intra-team strat-
egy. Basically, one of the team members is selected as representative are for
the team during the negotiation. This agent will act on behalf of the team
during the negotiation, making it responsible of selecting which offers are sent
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to the opponent, and whether or not opponent’s offers are accepted. The only
communications are those carried out between the representative agent are and
the opponent aop, and, therefore, this strategy is equivalent to a classic bilateral
strategy.
The representative agent negotiates according to its own utility function
Uare(.) since it does not know the utility function of the other participants. The
two decisions that have to be taken during the negotiation are which offers are
sent to the opponent, and whether or not the opponent’s offer is accepted.
3.1.1. Offer proposal
Being a time-bounded negotiation, the representative employs a time-based
concession tactic sare(.) to negotiate with the opponent. It is based on a team
deadline TA and a concession speed βA, which have been agreed upon prior to
the negotiation start:
sare(t) = 1− (1−RUare)(
t
TA
)
1
βA (4)
The concession strategy defines the aspiration level (utility demanded) by the
agent at a specific round t. This utility is demanded from the point of view of
the representative, and, so, any offer XtA→op proposed by are at round t will
obey the following condition:
Uare(X
t
A→op) = sare(t) (5)
Since there is a large number of offers that may obey the equation above, we
aimed to satisfy the opponent’s preferences as much as possible. As in the
case of the opponent strategy, the representative selects the offer that is the
most similar to the previous offer received from the opponent using a similarity
heuristic based on the Euclidean distance.
XtA→op = max
X|Uare (X)=sare (t)
Sim(X,Xt−1op→A) (6)
3.1.2. Offer acceptance
A common acceptance criterion in time-bounded negotiations is that an
opponent’s offer is accepted if it reports a utility which is higher than or equal
to the utility that is to be demanded in the next negotiation step. In the case
of the representative, it will accept the opponent’s offer Xtop→A at round t if it
reports a utility Uare(X
t
op→A) greater than or equal to sare(t+ 1). This can be
formalized as follows:
acare(X
t
op→A) =
{
accept if sare(t+ 1) ≤ Uare(Xtop→A)
reject otherwise
(7)
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3.1.3. Unanimity Level
It is clear that since the representative negotiates according to its own util-
ity function and reservation utility, it cannot guarantee any kind of unanimity
regarding team decisions. Decisions taken by the representative are acceptable
to himself (1 agent), but nothing can be assured about the rest of team mem-
bers. One could think that if no unanimity can be guaranteed, this strategy is
not worth being used. However, when team members tend to be very similar
this strategy is expected to yield acceptable results with communication costs
equivalent to a bilateral negotiation process.
3.2. Similarity Simple Voting (SSV)
The second intra-team strategy relies on a trusted mediator that helps team
members to participate in the negotiation process. Its main tasks involve coordi-
nation of voting processes and communications with the opponent. It should be
highlighted that the mediator communicates team’s decisions to the opponent,
and broadcasts opponent’s decisions among team members. Thus, the fact that
every team member participates in the negotiation process remains unknown
for the opponent. As for intra-team communications, it should be noted that
team members do not communicate among them, but they only communicate
anonymously with the mediator.
The decision rule used for voting processes is plurality/majority. More specif-
ically, a plurality rule is used in the voting process employed to decide which
offer is sent to the opponent, and a majority rule is used in the voting pro-
cess employed to decide opponent’s offer acceptance. A detailed view of the
intra-team strategy can be observed in Algorithm 1, which describes the whole
process from the point of view of the mediator.
3.2.1. Offer proposal
Whenever a new offer has to be proposed to the opponent at round t, the
mediator opens a call for proposals among team members. Each team member ai
is allowed to communicate anonymously one offer Xtai→A to be proposed to the
opponent. Once every proposal has been gathered, the mediator opens a voting
process where offers proposed XT t are made public among team members.
Then, each agent ai anonymously sends a multi-vote V oteai to the mediator.
A multi-vote gathers votes for every offer made public. We use the notation
V oteai(j) to denote the vote given by agent ai to the offer j-th from XT
t, and
XT t(j) as the j-th offer in XT t. The votes can be either positive (1), if the
offer j-th is acceptable for ai at round t, or negative (0), if the offer j-th is not
acceptable for ai at round t. Once all votes have been gathered, the mediator
sums up the number of positive votes and the most supported offer XtA→op is
selected, made public among team members, and sent to the opponent. When
a tie is produced, the tie-breaker rule consists in randomly selecting one of the
most supported offers. The following Equation describes the selection rule of
the previous mechanism:
XtA→op = argmax
Xj∈XT t
∑
ai∈A
V oteai(j) (8)
9
The paragraph above describes the intra-team protocol followed by team mem-
bers and mediator to determine which offer is sent to the opponent at round t.
However, team members are faced with two decisions in this intra-team protocol:
which offer should be proposed to the mediator during the call for proposals,
and the acceptability of each offer proposed during the aforementioned process.
We assume that, since the negotiation is time-bounded, team members follow
a time-based concession tactic where the concession speed βA is common and
agreed by teammates prior to the negotiation process:
sai(t) = 1− (1−RUai)(
t
TA
)
1
βA (9)
For the first decision, proposing an offer to team members, the agent ai proposes
an offer Xtai→A whose utility is equal to Uai(X
t
ai→A) = sai(t). Since there may
be more than a single offer with such utility, the agent has to choose one of
those offers. If the agent ai wants its offer X
t
ai→A to be accepted it should
maximize the probability of it being the most supported by team members and
the probability of it being accepted by the opponent:
Xtai→A = argmax
X|Uai (X)=sai (t)
pop(X)× pA(X) (10)
where pop(X) is the probability for X to be accepted by the opponent, and
pA(X) is the probability forX to be selected by team members. We incorporated
agents with a similarity heuristic based on the Euclidean distance over attribute
domains scaled to [0,1]. It takes into account the last offer proposed by the
opponent Xt−1op→A and the offer sent by team members in the previous negotiation
round Xt−1A→op. The most similar an offer is to X
t−1
op→A, the more probable it is
for the offer to be accepted by the opponent. Analogously, the most similar an
offer is to Xt−1A→op, the more probable it is for the offer to be the most supported
option in the voting process and, therefore, to be sent to the opponent. Thus,
Equation 10 can be approximated by similarity heuristics as follows:
Xtai→A = argmax
X|Uai (X)=sai (t)
pop(X)× pA(X) ≈
argmax
X|Uai (X)=sai (t)
Sim(X,Xt−1op→A)× Sim(X,Xt−1A→op)
(11)
Finally, for determining the acceptability of offers proposed by team members
at round t, we used a rational criterion so that an agent ai emits a positive vote
V oteai(j) = 1 for the j-th offer if it reports a utility that is greater or equal
than the utility marked by the concession strategy sai(t). Otherwise, the offer
is not supported and a negative vote is emitted. This process can be formalized
as:
V oteai(j) =
{
1 if Uai(XT
t(j)) ≥ sai(t)
0 otherwise
(12)
3.2.2. Offer acceptance
Whenever the mediator receives an offer Xtop→A from the opponent at round
t, it broadcasts the offer among team members. Then, the mediator opens up a
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majority voting process where each agent ai states whether or not the opponent’s
offer is acceptable acai(X
t
op→A) (1 for accept, 0 for reject). The mediator counts
the number of acceptances, and if the offers is supported by the majority (> |A|2 )
then it is accepted by the team. Otherwise, the offer is rejected. If the number
of team members is even and a tie has been produced, a random decision is
taken by the mediator. This mechanism can be described as follows:
acA(X
t
op→A) =

accept if
∑
ai∈A
acai(X
t
op→A) >
|A|
2
reject if
∑
ai∈A
acai(X
t
op→A) <
|A|
2
random otherwise
(13)
How team members ai decide the acceptability of the opponent’s offer acai(X
t
op→A)
follows the rational mechanism that we have employed so far. Basically, the offer
is acceptable (1) if it yields a utility which is greater than or equal to the utility
demanded by the concession strategy in the next negotiation round sai(t + 1).
Otherwise, the offer is not considered acceptable. The following Equation for-
malizes the acceptance criterion:
acai(X
t
op→A) =
{
1 if Uai(X
t
op→A) ≥ sai(t+ 1)
0 otherwise
(14)
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t = 0;
while t ≤ TA do
Send (Call For Proposals −→ A);
XT t = ∅;
foreach ai ∈ A do
Receive (Xtai→A ←− ai);
XT t = XT t
⋃
Xtai→A;
end
Send (Open Voting XT t −→ A);
foreach ai ∈ A do
Receive (V oteai ←− ai);
end
XtA→op = argmax
Xj∈XTt
∑
ai∈A
V oteai (j);
Send (XtA→op −→ op,A);
Receive (Xtop→A ←− op);
if Xtop→A = Withdraw then
Send (Opponent Withdraw −→ A);
Return Failure;
end
else if Xtop→A = Accept then
Send (Offer Accepted −→ A);
Return Success;
end
else
Send (Open Voting Xtop→A −→ A);
foreach ai ∈ A do
Receive (acai (X
t
op→A) ←− ai);
end
if acA(X
t
op→A)= accept then
Send (Accept −→ op,A);
Return Success;
end
else
Send (Opponent Offer Rejected −→ A);
end
end
t = t + 1;
end
Send (Withdraw −→ op,A);
Return Failure;
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code algorithm for the mediator in the Similarity Sim-
ple Voting intra-team strategy. Messages are represented as (Body direction
agents). Therefore, (Accept −→ op) means that the agent sends an accept
message to op, whereas (Reject ←− op) describes a message from op with the
content “Reject”.
3.2.3. Unanimity Level
The proposed method is capable of guaranteeing team decisions that are sup-
ported by a plurality/majority of the participants. More specifically, plurality
is assured in case of the offer proposed to the opponent, and majority is assured
when deciding opponent’s offer acceptance. Exceptions for this minimum level
of team unanimity are ties. For instance, the most extreme case is when team
members propose offers to the team, but they only support their own offers. In
that case, each proposal sums up exactly 1 positive vote and there is not a clear
plurality winner.
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3.3. Similarity Borda Voting (SBV)
SSV is capable of assuring majority and plurality decisions within the team.
However, some scenarios may need of intra-team strategies that ensure higher
levels of unanimity. SBV and FUM (described later) are designed to solve this
problem. The basic structure of SBV remains the same than in SSV, but the
voting rules employed are different. More specifically, when each team member
votes team proposals, borda count is employed to determine the winner, and
a unanimity rule is used to determine opponent’s offer acceptance. Next, we
briefly describe the aspects which make SBV different to SSV.
3.3.1. Offer proposal
As in SSV, when the team has to propose an offer to the opponent, the
mediator opens a call for proposals where each team member can propose an
offer to the mediator. Then, once every offer has been gathered, the mediator
makes public the offers proposed to the team members and a voting process
starts. The main difference between both intra-team strategies resides in the
fact that team members vote according to a Borda count rule [27]. Basically,
each team member ai ranks the proposals XT
t in ascending order according to
its own utility function Uai(.). We denote as rankai(XT
t) the ascending rank
according to ai’s utility function, and Position(X, rankai(XT
t)) as the position
(1 to |XT t|) that the offer X occupies in a ranked list. The vote emitted by
ai for offer j-th in XT
t is the position occupied by such offer in the ranked list
minus one unit:
V oteai(j) = Position(XT
t(j), rankai(XT
t))− 1 (15)
Numerical votes for each offer are summed up by the mediator, who finally
selects the offer that received the highest sum of scores from the team members
(see Equation 8). It should be highlighted that the similarity heuristic employed
by team members is the same than the one employed in SSV.
3.3.2. Offer acceptance
As for the offer acceptance, the only difference remains in the rule used by
the mediator. The opponent’s offer is accepted only if it is acceptable for all the
team members. The rationale acai(X
t
op→A) used by team members to determine
if an offer is acceptable at round t is equivalent to the one used in SSV. Thus,
the offer acceptance mechanism can be formalized as follows:
acA(X
t
op→A) =
{
accept if
∑
ai∈A
acai(X
t
op→A) = |A|
reject otherwise
(16)
3.3.3. Unanimity Level
When describing the minimum unanimity level guaranteed by SBV, we men-
tioned the term semi-unanimity. It is clear that if an opponent offer is accepted
by the team, it is acceptable for every team member due to the unanimity ruled
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employed. However, such unanimity is not guaranteed regarding the team deci-
sion on which offer is sent to the opponent. Borda count is generally referred as
a method that selects broadly accepted options as winners instead of the ma-
jority/plurality option (e.g., avoid the tyranny of the majority). In this sense,
Borda count entails some degree of unanimity. Nevertheless, the specific de-
gree of unanimity that Borda assures is difficult to determine in our negotiation
scenario.
3.4. Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM)
The last intra-team strategy, Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM), seeks to
reach unanimity regarding all team decisions. In fact, every team decision taken
(i.e., offer acceptance, offer proposal) following this intra-team strategy entails
unanimity at each round t of the negotiation process. However, the type of
mediator required for FUM is more sophisticated than in the rest of strate-
gies presented in this article. It requires that the mediator participates in a
pre-negotiation process where team members hand over decision rights over at-
tributes that are not interesting for them. Additionally, the team mediator
needs to be able to infer attributes’ importance for the opponent. Finally, it
also needs to coordinate unanimity voting processes, and an iterated building
process that constructs the offers sent to the opponent. A complete view of the
pseudo-algorithm carried out by the mediator can be observed in Algorithm 2.
3.4.1. Pre-negotiation: information sharing
During the pre-negotiation, team members are allowed to hand over decision
rights over some attributes that they do not consider interesting. The iterated
offer building process relies on a mechanism which sets attributes’ values one-
per-one according to team members’ will. When an agent hands over decision
rights on an attribute, it does not participate in the setting of such attribute.
All the communications in the pre-negotiation are private with the mediator,
who asks each team member regarding the set of attributes which it is willing
to hand over. The rationale behind the idea of handing over decision rights is
that conflict may be reduced, and, so, the chances to build a more likeable offer
for the opponent are increased while maintaining a good quality for one’s own
utility function. The fact that some attributes may yield little or no importance
at all for some team members is also feasible in a team setting, since some of
these attributes may have been introduced to satisfy the interests of a subgroup
of team members.
The pre-negotiation protocol goes as follows. First, the mediator opens
a call for decision rights, where each team member ai is allowed to send (to
the mediator) a set of negotiation attributes NIai , whose decision rights are
handed over by ai. Once all the responses have been gathered, the mediator
keeps track of those attributes that are not interesting for each agent NIai , and
those attributes that are not interesting for all team members
M⋂
i=1
NIai . Once
this process has finished, the team and the mediator are ready to start the
negotiation process.
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/*Pre-negotiation: information sharing*/;
Send (Ask for NIai −→ A);
foreach ai ∈ A do Receive (NIai ←− ai);
t = 0;
while t ≤ TA do
/*Offer proposal starts*/;
agenda = build agenda();
A′ = A; X
′t
A→op = ∅;
/*Attributes not interesting for every team member are maximized for the opponent*/;
foreach j ∈
M⋂
i=1
NIai do
xj = maximize for opponent(j);
X
′t
A→op = X
′t
A→op
⋃{xj};
end
/*The offer is built attribute per attribute*/;
foreach j ∈ agenda ∧ attribute not set(j) do
/*Ask about the value needed of attribute j*/;
Send (Needed value j, given X
′t
A→op −→ ai|j /∈ NIai ∧ ai ∈ A′);
Receive (xai,j ←− ai|j /∈ NIai ∧ ai ∈ A′);
if monotonically increasing(j) then xj = max
ai∈A
xai,j ;
else xj = min
ai∈A
xai,j ;
X
′t
A→op = X
′t
A→op
⋃{xj};
/*Ask about the acceptability of the partial offer*/;
Send (Acceptable X
′t
A→op? −→ ai|ai ∈ A′);
foreach ai ∈ A′ do
Receive (ac′ai (X
′t
A→op) ←− ai);
if ac′ai (X
′t
A→op) = true then A
′ = A′ − {ai};
end
/*If no more active agents, we do not ask team members anymore*/;
if A′ = ∅ then break;
end
/*Any attribute not set yet, is maximized for the opponent*/;
foreach j ∈ agenda ∧ attribute not set(j) do
xj = maximize for opponent(j);
X
′t
A→op = X
′t
A→op
⋃{xj};
end
XtA→op = X
′t
A→op;
Send (XtA→op −→ op,A);
/*Opponent offer acceptance starts*/;
Receive (Xtop→A ←− op);
if Xtop→A = Withdraw then
Send (Opponent Withdraw −→ A);
Return Failure;
else if Xtop→A = Accept then
Send (Offer Accepted −→ A);
Return Success;
else
Send (Open Voting Xtop→A −→ A);
foreach ai ∈ A do Receive (acai (Xtop→A) ←− ai);
if acA(X
t
op→A)= accept then
Send (Accept −→ op,A);
Return Success;
else
Send (Opponent Offer Rejected −→ A);
end
end
t = t + 1;
end
Send (Withdraw −→ op,A);
Return Failure;
Algorithm 2: Pseudo-code algorithm for the mediator in the FUM intra-team
strategy. 15
Of course, the set of attributes handed over by each team member is not
controllable by the mediator. It depends on the behavior of each agent. In our
model, the set of attributes handed over by each agent depends on a private
parameter ai . The value of such parameter is related to the weight of the
different negotiation attributes in one’s own utility function. More precisely, if
ai = 0, then the agent is only willing to hand over the decision rights over those
attributes that are not interesting for himself (i.e., weight equal to zero in the
utility function). When ai = 1, the agent is willing to hand over decision rights
over every attribute in the negotiation. In general, the agent is willing to hand
over decision rights over attributes whose sum of weight in the utility function
is equal to or lower than ai : ∑
j∈NIai
wai,j ≤ ai (17)
Given a certain ai , a reasonable heuristic is to assume that the agent is
willing to concede as many decision rights as possible since this will enhance
the possibility of finding an agreement with the opponent. Hence, each team
member ai chooses the largest possible set NIai that fulfills Eq. 17. A simple
algorithm that solves this problem is ordering the negotiation attributes in as-
cending order by weight in the utility function. The set NIai starts empty, and,
then, the array of ordered attributes is followed. If the attribute weight plus the
weights of those attributes already in NIai exceeds ai , then the search stops.
Otherwise, the attributes is added to NIai and the algorithm continues with
the next attribute. Our initial experiments with FUM [33] suggested that team
members should set its private ai to 0 and hand over decision rights only over
those attributes that are not interesting at all. Therefore, in the experimental
setting, we use ai = 0.
3.4.2. Negotiation: observing opponent’s concessions and building an attribute
agenda
Once the negotiation starts, the mediator attempts to guess a ranking of
attributes according to the opponent’s preferences. This ranking is used to
build an agenda of attributes, which is used in the iterated offer building process.
The idea behind the agenda is attempting to satisfy team members as much as
possible with those attributes that are less important for the opponent. This
way, team members may reach their desired aspiration level with those attributes
less interesting for the opponent, and use the rest of attributes to make the offer
as satisfactory as possible for the opponent. The only information available for
the mediator regarding the opponent’s preferences are the offers received. Thus,
the mediator has to infer a ranking of attributes according to that information.
A possible heuristic is assuming that agents usually concede less in important
attributes and greater concessions are performed in lesser important attributes
at the first rounds of the negotiation.
Our proposed heuristic assumes that the mediator observes opponent’s offers
for the first k interactions. In our experiments, the value of this parameter
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was set to k = bTA4 c [33]. Then, it calculates the concession performed in
each attribute. Since our model assumes that the opponent’s utility function
employs the opposite type of valuation function than team members for each
attribute, it is relatively easy to calculate the amount of concession performed
at each attribute. For instance, if the opponent is a seller, it is reasonable
to assume that its valuation functions is monotonically increasing (e.g., higher
prices report higher utilities) and, thus, any value below the maximum price
can be considered a concession with respect to the maximum price. Therefore,
the relative concession can be calculated in each attribute. For each attribute
j, we calculate the total amount of relative concession Cj in the first k offers:
Cj =
k−1∑
t=0
|X(j)top→A − best value(j)|
max value(j)−min value(j) (18)
where X(j)top→A it the value of attribute j in the offer X
t
op→A, best value(j)
is the best possible value for the opponent in attribute j, and max value(j)
and min value(j) are the maximum and minimum value of the attribute in the
negotiation domain. The inner part of the summatory determines the relative
concession on attribute j in the offer received at interaction/round t. So, the
summatory counts the total relative concession for attribute j in the first k
offers. The heuristic is that attributes that score lower in Equation 18 are
usually those more important for the opponent, whilst those attributes scoring
higher in Equation 18 are those less important for the opponent. Based on the
available information (i.e., number of rounds up to k), the mediator builds an
agenda of attributes according to the scores of Cj in descending order. This
way, lesser important attributes for the opponent are first in the agenda.
3.4.3. Negotiation: Offer proposal
In order to determine which offer is sent to opponent, the mediator governs
an iterated building process. The aim of this iterated process is building an of-
fer, attribute per attribute, so that the offer sent to the opponent is acceptable
for every team member. The order in which the attributes are adjusted is deter-
mined by the agenda built by the mediator. The first attribute in the agenda is
the one considered less important for the opponent, the second attribute is the
next lesser important attribute for the opponent, and so forth. Thus, the first
attributes set are those less important for the opponent. The heuristic used by
this iterated building process is attempting to satisfy team members’ demands
with those attributes that are less important for the opponent, and demand
as less as possible from those attributes that are the most important for the
opponent. Briefly, the iterated building process goes as follows.
1. The agenda of attributes agenda is built by the mediator according to the
available information. The first attribute in the agenda is the one guessed
as the less important attribute for the opponent.
2. When the iterated process starts, every team member is considered an
active member (ai ∈ A′) in the construction process.
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3. The initial partial offer X
′t
A→op starts as an offer whose attributes have
not been set.
4. The mediator checks those attributes that are not interesting for every
team member
M⋂
i=1
NIai . These attributes are maximized according to the
opponent’s preferences (i.e., if the price was one of these attributes, it
would be maximized for the opponent, thus, acquiring its minimum value).
The partial offer X
′t
A→op is updated with the new attributes’ values.
5. The next attribute j in the agenda is selected. Those team members active
in the construction process (ai ∈ A′) and interested in j (j /∈ NIai) are
asked by the mediator to submit the value xai,j needed of attribute j to
get as close as possible to their aspiration levels.
6. The values xai,j gathered from team members are aggregated. If the
assumed valuation function is monotonically increasing, then the max op-
erator is used to aggregate the values and obtain the final value for the
attribute xj . Otherwise, if the assumed valuation function is monoton-
ically decreasing, then the min operator is used to aggregate the values
and obtain xj .
7. xj is set in X
′t
A→op and the new partial offer is broadcasted among team
members. Every team member that is active in the construction phase is
asked if the current partial offer satisfies its current demands.
8. Every response is gathered by the mediator. Those agents that answered
positively are removed from the list of active agents. If there are still
active agents, the mediator goes back to 5.
9. When every team member has been satisfied by the partial offer X
′t
A→op,
if there are still attributes that have not been set, those attributes are
maximized according to the opponent’s preferences. Then, a final offer
XtA→op is obtained, made public among team members, and sent to the
opponent.
In the protocol described above, team members are asked to submit a value
for attributes in which they are interested, and to determine whether or not the
partial offer satisfies their needs. In both cases, as in previous strategies, we
have assumed that team members follow time-based concession tactics similar
to the one described in Equation 9, where βA has been agreed upon by team
members prior to the negotiation process. However, since team members may
have handed over some decision rights, it is not possible for agents to demand
the maximum utility. The value ai has to be subtracted from the maximum
utility. Therefore, the concession strategy sai(t), which determines the level of
demand at each negotiation round, can be formalized as:
sai(t) = (1− ai)− (1− ai −RUai)(
t
TA
)
1
βA (19)
When team members are asked about a value for j, each team member
communicates anonymously the value xai,j . The value communicated is the
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one that gets as close as possible to its desired aspiration level sai(t) at round
t. Taking the linear additive utility function formula, this can be calculated as:
xai,j = argmin
x∈[0,1]
(sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op)− wai,jVai,j(x)) (20)
where sai(t) is the utility demanded by the agent ai at round t, Uai(X
′t
A→op) is
the utility reported by the current partial offer, and wai,jVai,j(x) is the weighted
utility reported by the value demanded by the agent. Since the value demanded
looks to be as close as possible to the utility necessary to get to the current aspi-
ration, the function is minimized. However, the following constraint is fulfilled
by team members in order to avoid surpassing the utility demanded:
sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op)− wai,jVai,j(xai,j) ≥ 0 (21)
As for determining when a partial offer is acceptable, team members follow
a similar criterion to the method proposed in other intra-team strategies. Ba-
sically, a partial offer is acceptable for an agent ai if it reports a utility that is
greater than or equal to the aspiration level marked by its concession strategy:
ac′ai(X
′t
A→op) =
{
true if Uai(X
′t
A→op) ≥ sai(t)
false otherwise
(22)
where true indicates that the partial offer is acceptable at its current state for
agent ai, and false indicates the opposite.
3.4.4. Negotiation: Offer acceptance
Since this strategy looks for unanimity regarding team decisions, we em-
ployed the same mechanism employed in SBV for determining whether or not
an opponent offer is acceptable. When the mediator receives the opponent’s offer
Xtop→A, the offer is publicly announced to all of the team members. Then, the
mediator opens a private voting process where each team member ai should spec-
ify whether or not it supports acceptance of the opponent’s offer acai(X
t
op→A).
The mediator counts the number of positive votes. The offer is accepted if the
number of positive votes is equal to the number of team members. Otherwise,
the offer is rejected.
Similarly to SBV, an opponent offer is acceptable for a team member at
round t if it reports a utility that is greater than or equal to the aspiration level
marked by the concession strategy in the next round:
acai(X
t
op→A) =
{
true if sai(t+ 1) ≤ Uai(Xtop→A)
false otherwise
(23)
where true means that the agent supports the opponent’s offer, false has the
opposite meaning, and sai(.) is the concession strategy employed by agent ai to
calculate the aspiration level at each negotiation round t.
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3.4.5. Unanimity Level
As stated in the introduction of this section, this strategy is capable of guar-
anteeing unanimity regarding team decisions. How unanimity is guaranteed in
the offer acceptance phase is clear, since a voting process with unanimity rule
is employed. In [33] we showed how unanimity is also guaranteed in the offer
sent to the opponent. More specifically, the strategy is capable of guaranteeing
a strict unanimity: for any team member ai, the offer sent to the opponent
reports a utility that is greater than or equal to its aspiration level sai(t).
This is possible thanks to the iterated building process and the assumptions
in team members’ utility functions. Since team members share the same type
of monotonic valuation functions, the use of the max/min operator (max for
monotonically increasing valuation functions, min for monotonically decreasing
functions) ensures that for each attribute, each team member either gets exactly
the value demanded for the attribute or it gets a value that reports a utility
greater than or equal to the utility they demanded for the attribute. Hence,
when team members demand the exact value needed to get as close as possible
to their desired utility level, they will always get the same or greater utility than
the one they actually demanded. Thus, in the end, the offer will yield a utility
that is equal to or greater than their aspiration levels at round t.
4. Experimental Analysis
In this section we study how the four intra-team strategies presented in this
article perform under different environmental conditions. First, we introduce
the negotiation case employed for our experiments. Then, the environmental
conditions and performance measures studied are introduced and explained to
the reader. Finally, we describe the experiments carried out, and we analyze
the results provided by each intra-team strategy.
4.1. Negotiation Case: Group Booking
The negotiation case employed for our experiments is based on a group book-
ing negotiation with a hotel, which also illustrates the types of applications that
can be built using the intra-team strategies proposed in this article. In this sce-
nario, a group of friends who have decided to spend their holidays together has
to book accommodation for their stay. Their destination is Rome, and they
want to spend a whole week. Each friend is represented by his/her electronic
agent, who acts semi-automatically on behalf of its user. This agent has pre-
viously elicited the preferences of its user regarding booking conditions. Each
group member has different preferences regarding possible booking conditions.
Thus, the final agreement with the hotel should satisfy every friend as much as
possible. The group of agents engages in a negotiation with a well-known ho-
tel in their city of destination, which is also represented by an electronic agent.
During the pre-negotiation, both parties have decided to negotiate the following
issues:
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• Price per person (pp): The price per person is the amount of money that
each friend will pay to the hotel for the accommodation service. The issue
domain goes from 210$, which is the minimum rate (30$ per night), to
700$, which is the maximum rate (100$ per night). A realistic assump-
tion in the group of friends is that friends prefer to pay lower prices to
higher prices (i.e., monotonically decreasing valuation function), whereas
the seller prefers to charge higher prices to lower prices (i.e., monotonically
increasing valuation function).
• Cancellation fee per person (cf): When a booking is cancelled, the hotel
charges a fee to compensate for losses. The issue domain goes from 0$ (no
cancellation fee) to 150$. A realistic assumption in the group of friends is
that friends prefer to pay lower prices to higher prices (i.e., monotonically
decreasing valuation function), whereas the seller prefers to charge higher
prices to lower prices (i.e., monotonically increasing valuation function).
• Full payment deadline (pd): The full payment deadline indicates when the
group of friends has to pay the full price booking in order to confirm their
reservation. The domain goes from “Today”=0 days (the date time when
the final agreement has been signed) to “Departure Date”=30 days, which
indicates that the team should only pay when leaving the hotel. A realistic
assumption in the group of friends is that friends prefer to pay as late as
possible (i.e., monotonically increasing valuation function), whereas the
seller prefers to charge as soon as possible (i.e., monotonically decreasing
valuation function).
• Discount in bar (db): As a token of respect for good clients, the hotel
offers nice discounts at the hotel bar. The issue domain goes from 0%
(no discount) to 20%. A realistic assumption in the group of friends is
that friends prefer higher discounts to lower discounts (i.e., monotonically
increasing valuation function), whereas the seller prefers to offer lower dis-
counts prices to higher discounts (i.e., monotonically decreasing valuation
function).
4.2. Negotiation Environment Conditions & Team Performance
We consider that the negotiation environment plays a very important part
in team dynamics. It may not be the same using a representative approach in
a setting where all of the team members’ preferences are very similar than a
setting where team members’ preferences are exactly the opposite. Since condi-
tions of the negotiation environment highly vary depending on the application
domain, we decided to focus on those general conditions that are present in
almost every negotiation scenario involving negotiation teams: opponent dead-
line, team deadline, team members’ preference similarity, opponent concession
speed, and team size.
Regarding team performance, it is also acknowledged that there are several
well known social welfare measures to assess the quality of decisions in a society.
A negotiation team can be considered a small society, and, thus, social welfare
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measures can also be considered appropriate measures for measuring negotiation
teams’ performance. More specifically, we study the impact of the negotiation
environment on the minimum utility of team members (i.e., egalitarian social
welfare [4]), and the average utility of team members (i.e., a special case of
ordered weighted averaging [4]). However, we do not only restrain our analysis to
social welfare measures. Computational measures like the number of negotiation
rounds are also analyzed for all of the intra-team strategies.
4.2.1. Environment Condition: Opponent Deadline Length
One of the issues that can affect the negotiation process is the number of
interactions that the opponent has until he decides that negotiating is no longer
worthy, namely opponent deadline Top. We partitioned the opponent negoti-
ation deadline in three different classes: short deadline Top = U [5, 10] = S
1,
medium deadline Top = U [11, 29] = M , and long deadline Top = U [30, 60] = L.
4.2.2. Environment Condition: Team Deadline Length
Similarly, the maximum number of rounds that the team has to negotiate
also may impact the performance of the different intra-team strategies. As in
the case of the opponent deadline, we partitioned the team deadline in three
different classes: short deadline TA = U [5, 10] = S, medium deadline TA =
U [11, 29] = M , and long deadline TA = U [30, 60] = L.
4.2.3. Environment Condition: Team Similarity
25 different linear utility functions were randomly generated. These utility
functions represented the preferences of potential team members. 25 linear
utility functions were generated to represent the preferences of opponents. These
utility functions were generated by taking potential teammates’ utility functions
and reversing the type of Vi(.).
In order to determine the preference diversity in a team, we decided to
compare team members’ utility functions. We introduce a dissimilarity measure
based on the utility difference between offers. The dissimilarity between two
teammates can be measured as follows:
D(Uai(.), Uaj (.)) =
∑
∀X∈[0,1]n
|Uai(X)− Uaj (X)|
|X ∈ [0, 1]n| (24)
If the dissimilarity between two team members is to be measured exactly, it
needs to sample all of the possible offers. However, this is not feasible in the
current domain where there is an infinite number of offers. Therefore, we limited
the number of sampled offers to 1000 per dissimilarity measure. Due to the fact
that a team is composed by more than two members, it is necessary to provide
a team dissimilarity measure. We define the team dissimilarity measure as the
average of the dissimilarity between all of the possible pairs of teammates.
1U[5,10] is a uniform distribution from 5 to 10
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For all of the teams that had been generated, we measured their dissimilarity
and calculated the dissimilarity mean d¯t and standard deviation σ. We used
this information to divide the spectrum of negotiation teams according to their
diversity. Our design decision was to consider those teams whose dissimilarity
was greater than, or equal to d¯t+1.5σ as very dissimilar, and those teams whose
dissimilarity was lower than, or equal to d¯t− 1.5σ as very similar. In each case,
100 random negotiation teams were selected for the tests, that is, 100 teams were
selected to represent the very similar team case, and 100 teams were selected
to represent the very dissimilar team case. These teams participate in the
different environmental scenarios, where they are confronted with one random
half of all of the possible individual opponents. Therefore, each environmental
scenario (complete instantiation of all the environmental conditions) consists of
100×12×4=4800 different negotiations (each negotiation is repeated 4 times to
capture stochastic variations in the different intra-team strategies).
4.2.4. Environment Condition: Opponent Concession Speed
The concession speed of the opponent during the negotiation process βop may
determine the final quality of the agreement for team members. For instance, if
the opponent concedes very quickly towards its reservation utility, better agree-
ments for the team may come earlier in the negotiation process. In those cases,
even intra-team strategies that guarantee less degree of unanimity may achieve
good results. We divided the family of concession speeds based on the classic
classification of time-tactics: we considered that when βop = U [0.1, 0.49] = V B
the concession speed is very boulware, when βop = U [0.5, 0.99] = B the con-
cession speed is boulware, when βop = U [1, 10] = C the concession speed is
conceder, when βop = U [11, 40] = V C the concession speed is very conceder.
Similarly, when we refer to βA (the team concession speed), we will also employ
the same partition in boulware (B), very boulware (VB), conceder (C), and very
conceder (VC).
4.2.5. Environment Condition: Number of Team Members
We think that the number of team members may also influence the perfor-
mance of the different intra-team strategies. Some of the strategies may become
too demanding when the number of team members increases and it may result
in more negotiations ending in failure. Therefore, we decided to study the effect
of the team size on the performance of the different intra-team strategies. The
number of team members |A| ranged from 4 to 8. This number of team members
is motivated by the negotiation case employed in our experiments. We consider
that groups of friends from 4 to 8 persons are reasonable in practice.
4.2.6. Team Performance: Number of Negotiation Rounds
The number of negotiation rounds considers the number of interactions be-
tween the team and the opponent. It is a measure employed to assess the
negotiation time employed by the different negotiation strategies to reach a fi-
nal agreement. In our study, every pair offer/counter-offer in the negotiation
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thread is considered as a negotiation round. In equal conditions of utility per-
formance, those intra-team strategies that spend less negotiation rounds are
preferred since they employ less negotiation time to reach a final agreement.
4.2.7. Team Performance: Minimum Utility of Team Members
The minimum utility of team members (Min.) in a negotiation represents
the utility of the final agreement for the less benefited team member. If the
final agreement is X and the team is composed of M different team members
A = {a1.a2, ..., aM}, the minimum utility of team members can be calculated
as:
Min.(X) = min
1≤i≤M
Uai(X) (25)
In applications where there is a strong bond among team members (i.e., the
group of travelling friends), team members may attempt to maximize the min-
imum utility of team members in order to avoid extremely unsatisfied team
members and a degradation of the relationship among team members. Even if
a strong bond is not present among team members, an agent may attempt to
maximize the minimum utility of team members if it thinks that its own utility
is going to be the less favored utility by the final agreement.
4.2.8. Team Performance: Average Utility of Team Members
If the final agreement is X and the team is composed of M different team
members A = {a1.a2, ..., aM}, the average utility of team members can be cal-
culated as:
Ave.(X) =
1
M
∑
1≤i≤M
Uai(X) (26)
A less conservative agent may attempt to maximize the average utility of team
members if it thinks that its own utility is not going to be the less favored utility
by the final agreement.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Number of Negotiation Rounds
Although we measured the number of negotiation rounds in each experiment,
we found that a general pattern was found in almost every experiment. Thus,
instead of commenting the results for the number of negotiation rounds in each
experimental section, we decided to present the performance of the four intra-
team strategies according to the number of negotiation rounds just once. As
a sample for this behavior, we can observe the number of negotiation rounds
spent by each intra-team strategy when team and opponent have a long deadline
(Top = L and TA = L), the number of team |A| members is set to 4, and the
opponent uses different concessions speeds βop in Table 2.
As long as the concession speed of the four intra-team strategies can be
categorized as the same type, RE is usually the fastest intra-team strategy in
number of negotiation rounds, followed by SSV, then SBV, and finally FUM.
Since less unanimity is guaranteed among team members, it is logical that there
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Very Similar, Top = TA = L, M = 4 Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds
RE βA = V C 2.01 2.28 7.25 19.57 RE βA = V C 2.03 2.33 7.78 19.71
SSV βA = V C 2.02 2.41 8.35 22.08 SSV βA = V C 2.00 2.71 9.97 24.35
SBV βA = V C 2.01 2.70 10.48 24.83 SBV βA = V C 2.05 3.44 12.99 27.33
FUM βA = V C 2.11 2.63 10.31 24,10 FUM βA = V C 2.90 4.52 16.29 30.70
RE βA = C 2.39 3.77 11.07 23.47 RE βA = C 2.28 3.30 10.98 22.84
SSV βA = C 2.73 5.17 13.17 25.33 SSV βA = C 2.45 5.17 14.83 27.43
SBV βA = C 3.02 6.18 15.55 27.32 SBV βA = C 2.99 7.12 18.64 30.08
FUM βA = C 4.09 6.23 14.01 26.45 FUM βA = C 6.54 10.47 21.13 32.66
RE βA = B 9.17 13.63 22.48 30.73 RE βA = B 6.57 10.02 19.94 29.19
SSV βA = B 15.53 19.99 26.97 32.95 SSV βA = B 12.09 18.26 26.42 33.52
SBV βA = B 17.96 22.40 28.88 34.21 SBV βA = B 16.50 22.74 30.54 35.76
FUM βA = B 20.31 23.25 25.59 33.09 FUM βA = B 25.93 28.53 30.97 36.96
RE βA = V B 22.50 25.47 31.59 35.51 RE βA = V B 17.22 21.14 28.94 34.50
SSV βA = V B 28.62 31.44 35.27 37.22 SSV βA = V B 25.44 30.04 34.59 37.64
SBV βA = V B 31.50 33.21 36.24 37.80 SBV βA = V B 30.10 33.29 36.77 38.74
FUM βA = V B 32.77 33.67 33.97 37.15 FUM βA = V B 35.00 36.59 36.39 39.01
Table 2: The table depicts the comparison of the intra-team strategies when both parties have
a long deadline. Results show the average number of rounds spent in the negotiation.
may be less conflict with the opponent and, thus, agreements are found faster
with low unanimity strategies like RE and SSV. The main exception for this rule
is when team members are very similar and the opponent uses either boulware
or very boulware concession speeds. In those cases, FUM is able to finalize
negotiations successfully in fewer rounds than SBV (and sometimes SSV). The
learning heuristic employed by FUM benefits from the fact that the opponent
usually concedes more in those attributes that are less important and, thus, it is
able to infer a proper agenda and propose better offers to the opponent (ending
the negotiation faster). This pattern did not exist when team members are
very dissimilar, since in that case, FUM also has to deal with more intra-team
conflict. This results in more demanding offers to guarantee unanimity.
Additionally, as expected, as the concession strategy of team members be-
comes more conceder, the number of negotiation rounds spent is lower. Thus,
RE using βA = V B is slower than RE using βA = B, which is slower than RE
using βA = C, which is slower than RE using βA = V C.
The number of negotiation rounds spent by each intra-team strategy is es-
pecially interesting to select intra-team strategies when they perform equally in
utility terms (minimum or average utility). For instance, if SBV and FUM tie
in utility terms, a team is suggested to select SBV most of the times due to
the fact that it usually requires less negotiation rounds, if SSV and SBV tie in
utility terms, the team should select SSV since it usually requires less rounds
than SBV, and so forth.
4.3.2. Same Type of Deadlines
The next set of experiments that we conducted consisted in assessing which
intra-team strategies work better when both parties have the same type of dead-
line. More specifically, we chose those scenarios where both parties have short
deadlines or long deadlines. Additionally, for each type of deadline, we simulated
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Very Similar, Top = TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.687 0.794 2.94 0.590 0.711 3.67 0.415 0.551 5.08 0.292 0.408 6.31
SSV β = B 0.709 0.797 3.33 0.610 0.706 4.35 0.459 0.561 5.66 0.335 0.423 6.57
SBV β = B 0.719 0.796 3.67 0.620 0.703 4.73 0.477 0.568 5.93 0.348 0.427 6.79
FUM β = B 0.691 0.772 4.26 0.622 0.721 4.88 0.483 0.608 5.93 0.356 0.475 6.78
Very Similar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.758 0.853 9.18 0.667 0.779 13.637 0.476 0.617 22.486 0.327 0.457 30.735
SSV β = B 0.757 0.833 15.54 0.671 0.765 19.995 0.514 0.629 26.981 0.372 0.484 32.960
SBV β = B 0.774 0.833 17.97 0.698 0.765 22.409 0.541 0.628 28.891 0.402 0.489 34.220
FUM β = B 0.752 0.816 20.32 0.695 0.770 23.264 0.606 0.725 25.603 0.442 0.560 33.100
Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.264 0.621 2.551 0.198 0.549 3.169 0.115 0.421 4.67 0.072 0.303 6.171
SSV β = B 0.503 0.730 2.983 0.417 0.662 4.054 0.295 0.526 5.74 0.182 0.371 6.771
SBV β = B 0.550 0.735 3.659 0.467 0.653 4.900 0.341 0.526 6.229 0.213 0.368 7.050
FUM β = B 0.554 0.709 5.103 0.468 0.657 5.750 0.348 0.584 6.564 0.236 0.445 7.224
Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.383 0.725 6.583 0.270 0.630 10.030 0.118 0.454 19.945 0.064 0.319 29.198
SSV β = B 0.571 0.788 12.103 0.451 0.707 18.625 0.283 0.573 26.430 0.180 0.430 33.525
SBV β = B 0.650 0.797 16.508 0.551 0.713 22.746 0.373 0.562 30.552 0.242 0.416 35.766
FUM β = B 0.627 0.756 25.938 0.564 0.714 28.536 0.489 0.724 30.976 0.318 0.543 36.968
Table 3: The table shows the comparison of the intra-team strategies when both parties have
the same type of deadline. Results show the average for the minimum utility of team members
(Min.), the average utility of team members (Ave.), and the number of rounds (Ro.). The
results in bold font indicate those configurations that are statistically better and different
(t-test α = 0.05) to the rest of configurations.
scenarios where team members were either very dissimilar, or very similar, and
gathered information about the minimum and average utility of team mem-
bers regarding each possible strategy configuration (team concession speeds,
intra-team strategies, opponent concession speeds, etc.). The number of team
members remained static at |A| = 4.
The results for this experiment can be found in Table 3. It shows the average
minimum utility of team members (Min.), the average of the average utility of
team members (Ave.), and the average number of rounds (Ro.). It only shows
the results for intra-team strategies using a Boulware concession speed since
we found that this concession speed worked better than the rest of concession
speeds.
When both parties have a short deadline (first and third sub-table in Table
3), independently of team similarity, SBV β = B and FUM β = B are usually
the best options for the minimum utility. The unanimity and semi-unanimity
rules employed by this strategy make possible for the worst affected team mem-
ber to ensure that its situation is better than with other strategies. As for the
average utility of team members, FUM β = B usually is the best option. The
only exception for this pattern is when the opponent uses conceder strategies
(βop = V C or βop = C). In that case, all of the strategies perform similarly,
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especially when team members are very similar. For instance, we can observe
that RE, SSV, SBV β = B are the best option for the average utility of team
members when the deadline is short, team members are very similar, and the
opponent uses a very conceder strategy. In the same setting, but with the op-
ponent using a conceder strategy, FUM is statistically better but the differences
are not very important (less than a 1.8%).
However, when both parties have a long deadline to negotiate (subtables 2
and 4 in Table 3), FUM β = B becomes the best choice for the minimum and
average utility of team members in almost every scenario. The only exceptions
for this superiority are, again, scenarios where the opponent employs conceder
strategies. For instance, when the deadline is long, team members are very
dissimilar, and the opponent uses a very conceder strategy, SBV β = B is the
best intra-team strategy for the minimum and average utility of team members.
We can also observe that RE and SSV are specially affected by very dissimilar
preferences’ scenarios. When team members are very similar, both strategies
are capable of being close to SBV and FUM in the minimum and average utility
of team members as long as the opponent plays conceder strategies. However,
both intra-team strategies’ results get further from those of SBV and FUM when
team members are very dissimilar. These intra-team strategies are not able to
tackle situations where team members have very dissimilar preferences due to
the type of decision rule applied, and their use in such situations is discouraged.
The reason why several strategies perform similarly in utility terms when the
opponent plays conceder strategies is simple: Since the opponent concedes very
fast in the first rounds of the negotiation process, as long as the team does not
concede very fast (i.e., boulware strategy), all of the strategies are capable of
finding a reasonable good agreement in the first rounds by letting the opponent
concede and then accepting the opponent’s offer. However, there is an additional
reading that explains why strategies like FUM, which guarantees unanimity
regarding team decisions, does not perform so well when the opponent uses
conceder strategies. FUM relies on the assumption that the opponent concedes
very little in those attributes that are important for its interests at the first
rounds. However, when the concession strategy carried out by the opponent
is conceder or very conceder (a more acute effect) big concessions are usually
carried out at the first rounds. Thus, FUM is not able to infer an appropriate
agenda. In [33], it was shown that as the agenda gets further from the real
ranking of opponent preferences, the more demanding becomes the strategy.
This may have a negative effect in the negotiation, since more negotiations may
end in failure due to the high demands of the team. In fact a slight effect
is observed in the results: when the opponent uses a boulware strategy, the
percentage of successful negotiations is 94.6% which is greater than the 92.6%
obtained when the opponent uses a conceder strategy and the 93.1% obtained
when the opponent uses a very conceder strategy.
Another issue found in the results is the difference between FUM and other
strategies when the deadline is long. FUM tends to obtain better results when
the deadline is long for both parties. The differences with the other intra-team
strategies become greater when compared with the short deadline scenario. The
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reason for this phenomenon is similar to the reason mentioned in the paragraph
above. FUM is a strategy that relies on the information gathered in the negoti-
ation process. Thus, when interactions are lesser, like when deadlines are short,
the agenda inferred by the trusted mediator is less close to the ideal agenda.
When the agenda deviates from the ideal agenda, offers proposed by the team
are more demanding and less probable to be accepted by the opponent. As
a matter of fact, the reader can notice that the difference on average between
FUM β = B in long deadline scenarios (aggregating all of the scenarios where
the deadline is long) and the results obtained by FUM β = B in short deadline
(aggregating the scenarios where the deadline is short) scenarios counterpart is
7.9%, whereas it is 5.3% for SBV, 5.4% for SSV and 5.8% for RE. Logically,
every intra-team strategy benefits from having a longer deadline, but the results
suggest that FUM benefits more than the rest of intra-team strategies due to
its learning heuristic, which is based on the amount of information.
4.3.3. Different Types of Deadlines
The next experiment consisted in studying the behavior of the different intra-
team strategies when both parties have different types of deadline. Thus, in this
case, one of the two parties has a deadline which is lower than the deadline of
the other party. Clearly, the party with a lower deadline is at disadvantage with
respect to the other party since it has fewer offers to send before ending the
negotiation, and the pressure to accept the opponent’s offers arises earlier.
Short Team Deadline and Long Opponent Deadline. First, we start by analyzing
the case where the deadline of the team is shorter (short deadline) than the
deadline of the opponent party (long deadline). Hence, TA = U [5, 10] and
Top = U [30, 60]. The results of this experiment can be found in Table 4.
In this case, the team has a shorter deadline and, thus, it should be at
disadvantage with respect to the opponent. However, we can observe that when
the opponent uses a conceder or very conceder strategy, the results are similar to
the analogous case where both parties had a short deadline. These results can be
explained due to the fact that since the opponent concedes very quickly, a good
deal can be found for the team in the first rounds of the negotiation process and
the team is not affected by the fact that its deadline is shorter. Nevertheless, as
the opponent moves towards Boulware strategies, there is a clear negative effect
on the minimum and average utility of team members: all of the strategies are
affected by the fact that the team has a shorter deadline. In the scenario where
both parties have a short deadline (see Table 3), the average for the average
utility of team members in conceder settings (aggregating those negotiations
where βop = C or βop = V C) is 0.67, and the average for the average utility
of team members in boulware settings (aggregating those negotiations where
βop = B or βop = V B) is 0.45. Thus, the average utility for team members
is reduced a 22%. In this experiment (see Table 4), the average of the average
utility of team members in conceder settings is 0.63, whereas the average of the
average utility of team members in boulware settings is 0.10. Therefore, the
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average utility of team members is reduced a 53%, approximately doubling the
difference found in the case where both parties had a short deadline.
When team members are very similar (upper sub-table in Table 4), it can be
observed that, as in the scenario where both parties have a short deadline and
team members are very similar, several strategies perform very similarly. The
main difference resides in the fact that the only strategy capable of reaching
similar results to FUM β = B in the minimum and average utility is RE β = B.
Differently to the case when team members are very similar and the deadline for
both parties is short, the RE βA = B strategy is capable of achieving similar re-
sults to the other intra-team strategies even in less conceding settings (βop = C,
βop = B, and βop = V B). These results suggest that, despite not assuring
any minimum level of unanimity, employing a representative with a reasonably
slow concession (boulware) leads to good results compared with those obtained
by other intra-team strategies. A closer look at the experiments threw some
light over these results. For instance, when βop = B, the number of successful
negotiations was 2695 for RE βA = B, 1925 for FUM βA = B, 1855 for UBS
βA = B, and 2394 for SSV βA = B. The average utility for successful negotia-
tions was 0.32 for RE βA = B, 0.34 for SSV βA = B, 0.39 for SBV βA = B, and
0.42 for FUM βA = B. Hence, despite obtaining less quality results in success-
ful negotiations, the representative approach becomes a good option for these
scenarios because it leads to a great number of negotiations ending in success
where other intra-team strategies fail to succeed (utility=0). SSV, UBS, and
FUM need more interactions to find a satisfactory deal, but when they find it,
it is better in utility terms. However, in average, a representative approach may
be more adequate for settings where the team has a shorter deadline than the
opponent.
As for the scenario where team members are very dissimilar (lower sub-table
in Table 4), we can observe that the negative effect produced by having a shorter
deadline is especially acute when the opponent uses boulware or very boulware
concessions. The dissimilarities between team members, and the fact that there
are very few interactions to find a deal that satisfies both team and opponent,
contribute to a strong reduction in the minimum and the average utility of
team members. In terms of the minimum utility of team members, FUM and
SBV βA = B work better when the opponent uses conceder or very conceder
concessions. However, almost every intra-team strategy performs equally bad in
terms of the minimum utility of team members when the opponent moves to-
wards boulware concessions (especially in the very boulware case). In this case,
the representative approach can no longer compete with the rest of strategies
in terms of utility in most scenarios. Nevertheless, despite team members being
very dissimilar and RE not guaranteeing any unanimity regarding team deci-
sions, RE performs slightly better than the rest in terms of the average utility of
team members when the opponents concedes using boulware. The explanation
to this phenomenon is similar to the case where team members were very simi-
lar: a lesser number of negotiations end in failure (26% failures for RE, 33% for
SSV, 48% for SBV, and 46% for FUM), which compensates for the dissimilarity
between team members’ preferences and the unanimity level guaranteed by RE.
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Very Similar, Top = L, TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.643 0.756 3.232 0.483 0.609 4.542 0.152 0.242 7.112 0.027 0.048 8.284
SSV β = B 0.648 0.748 3.895 0.465 0.576 5.468 0.145 0.227 7.544 0.024 0.040 8.396
SBV β = B 0.656 0.743 4.370 0.473 0.568 5.995 0.139 0.199 7.876 0.019 0.028 8.457
FUM β = B 0.651 0.747 4.733 0.494 0.612 5.931 0.150 0.222 7.818 0.029 0.046 8.424
Very Dissimilar, Top = L, TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro. Min. Ave. Ro.
RE β = B 0.245 0.596 2.771 0.153 0.482 3.870 0.025 0.170 7.111 0.002 0.040 8.231
SSV β = B 0.459 0.703 3.444 0.280 0.540 5.553 0.035 0.156 7.919 0.002 0.017 8.526
SBV β = B 0.511 0.706 4.377 0.313 0.496 6.677 0.028 0.082 8.282 0.001 0.064 8.560
FUM β = B 0.520 0.704 5.825 0.336 0.545 7.003 0.026 0.084 8.333 0.001 0.060 8.565
Table 4: Comparison of the intra-team strategies when the team has a short deadline and
the opponent party has a long deadline. Results show the average for the minimum utility of
team members (Min.), the average utility of team members (Ave.), and the number of rounds
(Ro.). The results in bold font indicate those configurations that are statistically better and
different (t-test α = 0.05) to the rest of configurations.
In any case, the utility obtained for team members is so low in the average and
minimum utility of team members that, in some cases, it may even be better not
to negotiate with such kind of opponent and spend computational resources in
looking for another alternative.
Long Team Deadline and Short Opponent Deadline. In this case, the team has
an advantage over the opponent since its maximum deadline is longer than the
opponent’s deadline. The goal of these experiments is to determine the combi-
nation of intra-team strategies and negotiation parameters that maximize the
different social welfare measures employed. Thus, if the team has a maximum
deadline equal to the uniform distribution TA = U [30, 60], the team may decide
to play (prior to the negotiation) a different class of deadline like a medium
deadline (TA = U [11, 29]) or a short deadline (TA = U [5, 10]) if the results of
the simulation suggest that better results are obtained by not playing the max-
imum deadline. Thus, we also show the results for teams that play a medium
deadline, and teams that play a short deadline. In this experiment, the oppo-
nent plays a short deadline Top = U [5, 10]. The results of this experiment for
the very similar scenario can be observed in Fig. 1, whereas the results for the
very dissimilar scenario can be observed in Fig. 2.
We start by analyzing the results for scenarios where team members are
very similar (Fig. 1). We can observe that for situations where the opponent is
very conceder, the team benefits from playing strategies with the same deadline.
Since the opponent concedes very fast in the first negotiation rounds, the best
deals for the team may be proposed in the first negotiation rounds. Playing a
longer deadline may be risky since the team may have extremely high aspirations
during the whole negotiation, which results in most offers being rejected and
ending the negotiation in failure. As a matter of fact, the number of successful
negotiations for intra-team strategies playing a short deadline and boulware con-
cession was 95.1%, 68% for medium deadline and boulware concession, and 45%
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Figure 1: Results for very similar team members when the team has a long deadline and
the opponent has a short deadline. The dots indicate those configurations that perform
statistically better than the rest (t-test α = 0.05)
for long deadline and boulware concession, 29% for medium deadline and very
boulware concession, and 14% for long deadline and very boulware concession.
Other configurations may have a higher number of successful negotiations, but
they are not able to retain as much utility as the boulware configuration. As the
opponent starts to move towards strategies that concede more slowly, the best
intra-team strategies for the team are those played with a medium deadline and
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Figure 2: Results for very dissimilar team members when the team has a long deadline and
the opponent has a short deadline. The dots indicate those configurations that perform
statistically better than the rest (t-test α = 0.05)
boulware strategy (RE, SBV and SSV β = B). In those cases, the opponent
may not propose the best deals for the team until its last negotiation rounds.
Thus, playing a slightly longer deadline with a boulware concession comes at
an advantage for the team since the team does not fully concede in the whole
negotiation and still accepts last opponent’s offers. Some strategies played with
a medium deadline like FUM β = B are still too demanding, end up in more
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negotiation failures, and have very little information to learn the opponents’
preferences.
The very dissimilar scenario (Fig. 2) is a little bit different. In this scenario,
the team needs to deal with strong divergences in their preferences too. Thus,
teams are prone to be more demanding in order to accommodate the preferences
of as many team members as possible. We can observe that for cases where the
opponent uses conceder strategies, the team should play boulware strategies
with the same deadline. Similarly to the very similar scenario, playing a longer
deadline is risky since it results in extremely high aspirations and most offers
being rejected. However, in the very dissimilar scenario, the transition from
selecting short deadline strategies to selecting medium deadline strategies does
not appear until the opponent uses boulware strategies. This may be explained
precisely due to the dissimilarity among team members, which requires stronger
demands that are not met when playing medium deadline. As the opponent
starts to concede using boulware strategies, the best intra-team strategies are
usually found in the medium deadline, as in the very similar scenario case.
In conclusion, in this experiment we have observed that, generally, even
though the team is able to play a long deadline and the opponent plays a short
deadline, the team would benefit more from playing the same type of deadline
than the opponent or a slightly longer deadline.
4.3.4. Team size effect on intra-team strategies
We also decided to analyze the effect of the team size on the performance
of the different intra-team strategies. Thus, we repeated the conditions in 4.3.2
increasing the number of team members. However, we only analyzed intra-
team strategies whose βA = B since they were those one that obtained better
results in Table 3. We excluded the RE strategy from the analysis. Since
team members do not interact in RE and no unanimity level is guaranteed,
the inclusion of additional team members should not affect the way in which
the strategy works. The results of this experiment can be found in Figure 3.
It shows the average and minimum utility of team members for teams of size
|A| = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
Generally, it can be observed in all of the graphics in Figure 3 that, as the
number of team members increases, the quality of the results in terms of the
minimum and the average utility is reduced. This behavior was expected since
as the number of agents increases, the set of possible agreements is reduced and
the conflict inside the team and with the opponent is increased. However, the
reduction in utility terms can be appreciated more easily in the minimum utility
of team members. The average for the average utility of team members when
|A| = 4 is 0.70 (aggregating all other factors) and 0.67 for |A| = 8 (aggregating
all other factors), whereas the average for the minimum utility of team members
when |A| = 4 is 0.48 and 0.41 for |A| = 8. As the number of team members
increases, the contribution of each team member to the average utility is lesser,
and that is the reason why the negative effect of team size on utility measures
can be observed more easily in the minimum utility of team members than in
the average utility of team members.
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We expected that as the number of team members increased, the perfor-
mance of unanimity intra-team strategies like FUM would greatly decrease com-
pared to the performance of SSV since more team members would increase the
demands of the team and make offers less interesting for the opponent. How-
ever, the difference in performance between the three strategies is approximately
maintained in almost every graphic as the number of team members increases.
Therefore, team size did not have a different effect on the performance of the
three intra-team strategies, affecting all of intra-team strategies equally. The
decision on which intra-team strategy should be chosen is not affected by team
size.
The only clear exceptions to this rule are scenarios where the opponent uses
conceder strategies (βop = C and βop = V C) and team members’ preferences
are very dissimilar (first two graphics in rows 3 and 4, Figure 3). In these
scenarios, we can observe that there is a special negative effect of team size on
the performance (mininum utility and specially in the average utility) of FUM
with respect to the other intra-team strategies, which results in FUM being one
of the worst choices when the number of team members in large (e.g., second
graphics in rows 3 and 4, Figure 3). As a numeric example of the reduction
in the performance of FUM , the difference in the average utility between SBV
and FUM goes from approximately a 2% (|A| = 4) to 10% (|A| = 8) when
βop = V C and the deadline is short, from approximately a 0% (|A| = 4) to 5%
(|A| = 8) when the deadline is short and βop = C, and from 3% (|A| = 4) to 8%
(|A| = 8) when the deadline is long and βop = V C . This phenomenon has a
reasonable explanation. When the opponent uses conceder strategies, FUM has
greater difficulties to learn a proper attribute agenda. If the number of team
members increases and they are very dissimilar, the demands of team members
increase, which summed up to the fact that the agenda does not properly reflect
the preferences of the opponent, results in demanding team proposals.
5. Related Work
Multi-agent systems have gained a growing interest as the infrastructure
necessary for the next generation of distributed systems. Due to the inherent
conflict among agents, techniques that allow agents to solve their conflicts and
cooperate are needed. This need is what has given birth to a group of tech-
nologies which have recently been referred to as agreement technologies [26, 37].
Trust and reputation [31, 40, 41], norms [7, 5], agent organizations [15, 9, 38],
argumentation [29, 28] and automated negotiation [18, 36] are part of the core
that makes up this new family of technologies.
Even though agreement technologies are a novel topic in the community of
agent research, some of its core technologies like automated negotiation have
been studied by scholars for a few years. In definition, automated negotiation
is a process carried out between two or more parties in order to reach an agree-
ment by means of exchange of proposals. Two different research trends can be
distinguished in automated negotiation models. The first type of model aims to
calculate the optimum strategy given certain information about the opponent
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Figure 3: Size effect when team and opponent have the same type of deadline
and the negotiation environment [16, 6, 12]. The second type of model encloses
heuristics that do not calculate the optimum strategy but obtain results that
aim to be as close to the optimum as possible [10, 19, 11, 23]. These models
assume imperfect knowledge about the opponent and the environment, and aim
to be computationally tractable while obtaining good results. This present work
can be classified into the latter type of models.
In multi-agent systems, most of the research has concentrated on bilateral
models where each party is a single individual. The present article studies
bilateral negotiations where at least one of the parties is a negotiation team,
composed by more than a single individual. It should be noted that the problem
of finding an agreement for a negotiation team is inherently complex since it
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not only requires finding an agreement with the other party but it also entails
reaching some type of unanimity within the team. Even though communications
with the opponent party may be similar to classical bilateral models, negotiation
teams may require an additional level of negotiation that involves team mem-
bers. Thus, classical bilateral models cannot be applied directly if a certain
level of unanimity regarding team decisions is necessary . As far as we know,
our previous work [34, 35, 33, 32] is the only work that focuses on negotiation
teams.
In [34] we introduced the topic of negotiation teams in agent research from a
descriptive perspective. We analyzed the different phases necessary for an agent-
based negotiation team to face such negotiations with success. Apart from the
phases that we identified, we also described the current technologies that may be
appropriate for the development of such phases. Later, we introduced our first
experimental study [35] comparing intra-team strategies in different negotiation
environments. That paper should be considered the preliminary basis for our
current analysis. We have introduced changes in the intra-team strategies, and
our current study applies a more fine-grained analysis of the negotiation envi-
ronment and its possible scenarios. Additionally, we also studied the properties
of the Full Unanimity Mediated intra-team strategy in [33]. However, a thor-
ough analysis of how environmental conditions affect team performance was not
carried out. Finally, we should also highlight our work regarding the study of
cultural factors in negotiation teams [32]. The setting is different to the current
article. We attempted to propose a computational model for explaining how
human cultural factors affect team dynamics in negotiation teams composed
by humans. In this present article we do not consider humans but automated
agents. Therefore, human factors are not relevant to the present study.
Apart from agent-based negotiation teams, bilateral negotiation is perhaps
the most similar topic to our current research. Hence, we describe some of
the most important bilateral models that assume imperfect knowledge. Faratin
et al. [10] propose a bilateral negotiation model for service negotiation where
agents apply and mix different concession tactics (i.e., time-dependent, imita-
tive and resource-dependent). In their work, they analyze the impact of the
model’s parameters and determine which configurations work better in different
scenarios by means of experiments. Our proposed work also assumes the use of
time-dependent concession tactics for the calculation of agents’ aspirations at
each negotiation round. Additionally, we also take an experimental approach to
validate the impact of our model’s parameters. Later, the authors proposed a
bilateral negotiation model [11] whose main novelty was the use of trade-offs to
improve agreements between two parties. A trade-off consists of reducing the
utility obtained from some negotiation issues with the goal of obtaining the same
exact utility from other negotiation issues. The rationale behind trade-offs is to
make the offer more likable for the opponent while maintaining the same level
of satisfaction for the proposing agent. For that purpose, the authors propose
a fuzzy similarity heuristic that proposes the most similar offer to the last offer
received from the opponent. Some of our intra-team strategies like Similarity
Simple Voting and Similarity Borda Voting also employ similarity heuristics to
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attempt to satisfy team members’ preferences and the opponent’s preferences.
Jonker and Treur propose the Agent-Based Market Place (ABMP) model [19]
where agents, engage in bilateral negotiations. ABMP is a negotiation model
where proposed bids are concessions to previous bids. The amount of concession
is regulated by the concession factor (i.e., reservation utility), the negotiation
speed, the acceptable utility gap (maximal difference between the target utility
and the utility of an offer that is acceptable), and the impatience factor (which
governs the probability of the agent leaving the negotiation process).
Lai et al. [23] propose a decentralized bilateral negotiation model where
agents are allowed to propose up to k different offers at each negotiation round.
Offers are proposed from the current iso-utility curve according to a similarity
mechanism that selects the most similar offer to the last offer received from
the opponent. The selected similarity heuristic is the Euclidean distance since
it is general and does not require domain-specific knowledge and information
regarding the opponent’s utility function. Results showed that the strategy
is capable of reaching agreements that are very close to the Pareto Frontier.
Sanchez-Anguix et al. [36] proposed an enhancement for this strategy in envi-
ronments where computational resources are very limited and utility functions
are complex. It relies on genetic algorithms to sample offers that are interest-
ing for the agent itself and creates new offers during the negotiation process
that are interesting for both parties. Results showed that the model is capa-
ble of obtaining statistically equivalent results to similar models that had the
full iso-utility curve sampled, while being computationally more tractable. As
commented above, some of our intra-team strategies use similarity heuristics to
satisfy team members’ preferences and the opponent’s preferences.
Another topic that resembles team negotiations are multi-party negotiations.
Several works have been proposed in the literature along this line [8, 21, 13].
For instance, Ehtamo et al. [8] propose a mediated multi-party negotiation pro-
tocol which looks for joint gains in an iterated way. The algorithm starts from
a tentative agreement and moves in a direction according to what the agents
prefer regarding some offers’ comparison. Results showed that the algorithm
converges quickly to Pareto optimal points. Klein et al. [21] propose a medi-
ated negotiation model which can be extended to multiple parties. Their main
goal is to provide solutions for negotiation processes that use complex utility
functions to model agents’ preferences. The negotiation attributes are not in-
dependent. Therefore, preference spaces cannot be explored as easily as in the
linear case. Later, Ito et al. [13] proposed different types of utility functions
(cube and cone constraints) and multiparty negotiation models for such utility
functions. The main difference between our work and multi-party negotiations
lies in the nature of the conflict and how protocols are devised. Even though
each team member could be viewed as a participant in a multi-party negotiation
with the opponent, it is natural to think that team members’ preferences are
more similar (e.g., a team of buyers, a group of friends, etc.) and they trust
other teammates more than the opponent (i.e., they may share more informa-
tion). Furthermore, multi-party negotiation models may be unfair for agents
that are alien to the team if the number of team members exceeds the num-
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ber of other participants. In that case, multi-party models may be inclined to
move the negotiation towards agreements that maximize the preferences of most
participants (i.e., team members).
Multi-agent teamwork is also a close research area. Agent teams have been
proposed for a variety of tasks such as Robocup [39], rescue tasks [20], and
transportation tasks [17]. However, as far as we know, there is no published
work that considers teams of agents negotiating with an opponent. Most works
in agent teamwork consider fully cooperative agents that work to maximize
shared goals. The team negotiation setting is different since, even though team
members share a common interest related to the negotiation, there may be
competition among team members to maximize one’s own preferences.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
An agent-based negotiation team is a group of two or more interdependent
agents that join together as a single negotiation party because they share some
common interests in the negotiation at hand. Intra-team strategies govern which
decisions are taken by the negotiation team, and how and when these decisions
are taken. The goal of this article is studying how environmental conditions
affect the performance of different intra-team strategies for a team negotiating
with an opponent. We studied how the deadline of both parties, the concession
speed of the opponent, similarity among team members’ preferences and team
size affect the performance of Representative (RE) intra-team strategy, Simi-
larity Simple Voting (SSV) intra-team strategy, Similarity Borda Voting (SBV)
intra-team strategy and Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM) intra-team strategy
in terms of the minimum utility of team members, the average utility of team
members and the number of negotiation rounds. The results suggest that de-
pending on the environmental conditions and the team performance metric, team
members should select different intra-team strategies, which confirms our initial
hypothesis in this article. Next, we summarize some of the most important
results found in this paper:
• Generally, when the concession speed is the same for the different intra-
team strategies, RE takes less numbers of negotiation rounds than SSV,
which takes less number of rounds than SBV, which takes less number of
rounds than FUM. The exception for this rule is when team members are
very similar and the opponent uses boulware or very boulware strategies,
which makes FUM usually faster than SBV.
• FUM tends to clearly outperform the rest of intra-team strategies studied
in utility terms (minimum and average utility of team members) when the
deadline of both parties is long and the opponent uses either boulware of
very boulware concession strategies. When the opponent uses conceder or
very conceder strategies, different intra-team strategies tie in terms of the
minimum and average utility of team members depending on the rest of
environmental conditions.
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• When the team deadline is way shorter than the opponent’s deadline, all
of the intra-team strategies are negatively affected in the results obtained
in the minimum and average utility of team members. Additionally, if
team members are very similar, RE becomes one of the best choices for
the average utility of team members since it is capable of ending more
negotiations successfully where other intra-team strategies fail. If team
members are very dissimilar, FUM and SBV tend to work better in terms
of utility (minimum and average). However, if the opponent uses boulware
or very boulware concession strategies every intra-team strategy performs
equally bad and team members are encouraged to look for other negotia-
tion alternatives.
• In situations where the team’s maximum deadline is longer than the op-
ponent’s deadline, the team should not play intra-team strategies with
the maximum deadline but intra-team strategies with the same type of
deadline than the opponent or a slightly longer type of deadline. Other-
wise, the team performance in utility terms is not maximized due to more
negotiations ending in failure.
• As the number of team members increases, the performance in utility
terms of all of the intra-team strategies is negatively affected. However,
in general, all of the intra-team strategies studied are equally affected
by the increment in the number of team members. Thus, team size did
not have an effect on the intra-team strategy that should be selected by
team members to maximize the minimum or the average utility of team
members.
The field of negotiation teams is novel in the area of multi-agent systems.
Therefore, there is much work to be done in order to advance the state-of-the-
art. Current works in agent-based negotiation teams [34, 35, 33, 32] have focused
on negotiation processes where the team has a strong potential for cooperation
since team members share the same type of monotonic valuation function for
negotiation issues. However, it is possible to assume that in some negotiation
scenarios there is more conflict among team members since valuation functions
may be of a different type of monotonic function among team members, or
the valuation function itself is not predictable in the negotiation domain (e.g.,
colors, brands, etc.). Our current future work involves designing intra-team
strategies that are able to tackle negotiation domains where attribute’s valuation
functions may be unpredictable. RE, SSV and SBV are able to handle such
types of domains by definition. However, FUM, which is the strategy capable
of guaranteeing unanimity regarding team decisions, is not capable of handling
domains where attributes are unpredictable (due to the max/min aggregation
operator). Hence, our future works consists in proposing an intra-team strategy
capable of guaranteeing unanimity for negotiation domains where attributes
may not be predictable.
On the other hand, since the results of this present article have shown that
environmental conditions do affect the performance of intra-team strategies, we
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plan to propose a mechanism that allows team members to infer the most prob-
able state of the negotiation environment, and according to that information,
advise the use of an appropriate intra-team strategy.
Finally, in our current work we assume that team members have the same
knowledge about the negotiation domain and they have the same skills. It may
be interesting to study scenarios where team members have different knowledge
and skills.
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